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Abstract
Over the past 15 years, virtualization has become a standard way to migrate old
software to new hardware, isolate untrusted code, and encapsulate application state.
However, many of the techniques for implementing common virtualization functional-
ity, such as transparent isolation and full-system record and replay, rely on hardware
features provided by the x86 architecture. As the mainstream computing landscape
diversifies to include less feature-rich mobile and embedded systems, it is critical
to rethink how to efficiently provide core virtualization functionality with limited
hardware support.
As a result, this dissertation explores the feasibility of providing common virtu-
alization functionality with limited hardware support.
We propose three approaches to virtualization using limited hardware support.
First, we describe a way to transparently virtualize a CPU using hardware break-
points and on-demand control-flow analysis. Next, we describe a way to record-
and-replay virtual machine execution without relying on a hardware branch counter.
And finally, we describe a virtual storage system that improves virtual machine I/O
performance through a logging block store for inexpensive SD cards.
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1Introduction
Virtualization is a technique that allows a piece of software to execute identically,
barring timing effects, within a secured sandbox as it does on hardware while ensuring
that the majority of the softwares instructions are directly executed on the CPU.
In computer science, sandboxes are a security mechanism for separating running
programs (Goldberg et al. (1996)). Web browser sandboxes, for example, can be used
to run and render untrusted websites and prevent malicious code from compromising
the operating system.
Virtualization provides code with the illusion of running in one execution envi-
ronment, while in reality executing in another one. For example, kernel code may
think that it is running in a privileged mode, when it isn’t. In order to virtualize a
physical machine, all the physical hardware on a typical machine must be virtualized.
This includes CPU, memory, I/O, etc.. Virtualization is a powerful and well studied
technique that can be used in a variety of ways. Over time, virtualization has evolved
to provide security, encapsulation and isolation for multiple operating systems, al-
lowing them to co-exist, run simultaneously and share resources on a single physical
machine.
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A virtual machine monitor (VMM), or a hypervisor, is a piece of software that
provides virtualization functionality. The software that runs within the virtualization
sandbox is the guest, or the virtual machine (VM). The software environment that
the VMM runs within is the host. A Type 1 hypervisor runs directly on the physical
hardware and has total control over its physical devices. A Type 2 hypervisor runs
within a host operating system and does not have direct control over the physical
devices, and instead emulates virtual devices with the assistance of the host operating
system. Because the guests do not have direct control over physical hardware, they
are presented with virtual devices emulated and managed by the hypervisor. A
typical scenario for a virtualization environment is to have the guest operating system
run on virtual CPUs and communicate with a virtual network adapter and virtual
disk drives. The virtual network adapter can be bridged or directly connected to a
physical network adapter and the virtual disk drives are usually stored as virtual disk
images on the physical disks. A typical use case scenario involves VMMs running on
physical machines within a data center, with the VMMs separating and managing
many guest operating systems on the same physical machine, and managing the
physical resources on it.
With virtualization emerged many useful and important functionality made pos-
sible by executing software under a VMM. One of them is record and replay, which is
the ability to record the trace of a sequence of instruction execution and re-execute
the sequence to produce the same output with the same input. This functionality
is very useful, for example, when we can record the trace of execution of a virtual
machine and produce the same result on another virtual machine and have a backup
copy running in case the first one crashes. Other than providing fault tolerance,
record and replay may also be useful in providing developers with better debug in-
formation by reproducing the sequence of events leading to the bug.
The most straightforward way of sandboxing an operating system is emulation. It
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requires emulating or translating all the instructions of the sandboxed software into
another set of instructions that can be executed within the sandbox. QEMU (Bellard
(2005)) for example, emulates a machine-like environment for operating systems on
many different architectures and enable them to run on the x86 architecture. It is
much slower because the translation and emulation can be very costly when used
on every single instructions of the target software, but it is among the very few
ways to execute binaries intended for one set of CPUs on another set of CPUs
with incompatible and different instruction sets. In Chapter 3 we will discuss the
performance of QEMU and emulation in general.
In contrast, we can achieve much faster speed by having the majority of the vir-
tual machine run natively without emulation. However, the virtualization sandbox
usually means that the software running within the sandbox would run with a differ-
ent, usually non-privileged, environment than a physical CPU, because in order for
the VMM to provide the encapsulation and security properties, the sandboxed soft-
ware cannot have direct control over the CPU. Because some privileged-mode-only
instructions cannot be executed under non-privileged mode, the VMM must regain
control just before emulation is required.
In the past, virtualization had been intensively studied on the x86 architecture
and in the context of desktops and servers, and many virtualization implementations
assume some hardware features specific to the x86 architecture. For example, a typ-
ical way of providing CPU virtualization, binary translation, requires architectural
features such as segmentation, and in general, an execute-only mechanism (i.e. the
ability for a region of memory to contain executable but not readable code) on the
CPU. Record and replay implementations, for example, assume that the CPU has
precise hardware branch counters. Beyond CPU virtualization, when moving beyond
just desktop and server system architectures, devices exhibits different characteris-
tics than desktops and servers, introducing complications when virtualizing. For
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example, we are faced with disproportionately slow external storage devices that is
used to store virtual machine images on mobile devices such as smartphones.
In recent years, as mobile devices started to become an essential part of everyday
computing, virtualization on mobile devices has begun to emerge as a solution for
supporting multiple profiles on the same device. However, many old ARM processors
and embedded processors do not share the same hardware features as x86 processors.
For example, even though very top tier devices are starting to be equipped with
CPUs having hardware virtualization support, there are millions of existing and
new devices without such support. ARM-based mobile and embedded systems do
not have reliable hardware branch counters and usually do not have fast storage
systems.
In this dissertation, we attempt to explore how to provide virtualization using
a limited set of hardware features common on ARM-base mobile and embedded
systems.
In Chapter 3, we attempt to provide a transparent CPU virtualization solution
using hardware breakpoints and control flow analysis. Hardware breakpoints are
usually CPU specific registers and the functionality to stop execution at a desired
pointed set in advance by software. It is widely available on almost all architectures
due to it being one of the few basic functionalities an architecture must provide
to ensure that software running on it is debuggable. Control flow analysis is an
analysis performed on software without actually executing it, which determines the
order of which instructions are executed. We utilize control flow analysis to pinpoint
instructions that cannot be executed directly within the virtual machine sandbox
and trap them with the assistance of hardware breakpoints.
In Chapter 4, we explore the possibility of providing record and replay function-
ality on CPUs without hardware branch counters. We show that by inspecting the
guest kernel internal states we can provide useful record and replay functionality
4
without strictly adhering to the sequence of recorded execution during replay.
In Chapter 5, we discuss a specific problem for virtualization on mobile devices.
We will show that it is highly inefficient to store VMs virtual disk images using
standard virtual machine image formats directly on a mobile devices external storage,
which is usually an SD card. We will propose an alternative solution with much
improved VM I/O performance.
As a result of this work, we will validate the following hypothesis: It is possible
to efficiently virtualize and provide advanced virtualization functionality to a range
of systems without relying on x86 and PC specific virtualization technologies.
5
2Related work
2.1 CPU Virtualization
Virtualization, since its inception decades ago (Goldberg (1974)), has found its way
into many areas of personal computing and cloud computing. The core concept of
virtualization is to provide a sandbox for operating systems so that multiple oper-
ating systems can be run on the same machine without affecting each other. This
conceptual sandbox provides important abstraction and isolation properties so that
it is possible to abstract, share and manage resources on a single physical machine
among many virtual machines running on the same hardware.
Ideally, we would like to have operating systems run within the sandbox without
any modification (i.e. modification to the source code and recompilation). On archi-
tectures which are not classically virtualizable such as pre-VT x86 and pre-VE ARM,
binary translation is the technique used to run unmodified guest operating systems
with reasonable speed. Other types of virtualization, for example, paravirtualization
and user/application level virtualization requires access to and modification of the
source code of the guest operating system or applications.
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One of the common problems facing virtual machine implementations is how to
deal with the privileged mode instructions. Such instructions operate on privileged
processors features such as page tables and I/O, and can only be executed within
privileged mode without trapping or having incorrect semantics (e.g. as with sensitive
instructions)(Goldberg (1974)). Xen (Barham et al. (2003)) talks about a widely
used virtual machine and the idea of paravirtualization. Paravirtualization requires
modification of the guest kernel source code so that these instructions are changed
to hypercalls into the virtual machine monitor, whereas full virtualization does not
require a modification of the guest kernel. Usually full virtualization is implemented
using binary translation or with hardware virtualization support. Paravirtualization
trades slightly better performance and a simpler virtual machine monitor for the
inconvenience of modifying the guest kernel. UML (King et al. (2003)) takes a step
even further to incorporate VMM modifications in both the host and the guest to
eliminate most of the overhead of switching among host OS, the VMM and the guest
to improve performance of the guest.
Hardware virtualization support is a CPU feature that allows a VMM to virtualize
without having to deal with sensitive instructions. Without hardware virtualization
support, the traditional way of implementing virtualization on x86 is binary trans-
lation. Bugnion et al. (2012) describes how binary translation is done on x86 using
segmentation techniques. Adams and Agesen (2006) compares performance of binary
translation against early hardware assisted virtualization on x86.
Cell (Andrus et al. (2011)) describes an Android level virtualization by emulating
devices required by Android (such as timer, GPU, camera, radio etc.) using OS-level
containers and namespace isolation and have virtual phones running a full Android
user mode stack. This approach is very fast but is only applicable to Android.
Many other virtualization platforms use similar binary translation or binary
rewrite techniques. Virtualization by emulation (Bochs (Lawton (1996)) for exam-
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Table 2.1: Trade-offs among virtualization implementations
Modification
of guest
required?
Speed Hardware re-
quirements
Implementation
complexity
Emulation No Very
slow
None High
Hardware virtualization No Very
fast
Hardware vir-
tualization
support
Low
Binary translation No Fast Execute only
mechanism
Very high
Paravirtualization Yes Fast None Low
ple) simulates the entire machine environment, decodes the machine instructions and
emulates their result. It has the advantage of being able to execute cross-platform
code, because the instructions are not directly executed but emulated. Another ex-
ample is QEMU (Bellard (2005)), which provides a faster emulation by dynamically
parsing and compiling instruction streams into native code.
While all virtual machine implementation techniques provide isolation and en-
capsulation properties, they trade among the need for kernel source modification,
hardware requirements and performance (Table 1).
In addition, Turtles (Ben-Yehuda et al. (2010)) describes a nested virtualization
architecture where virtual machines run inside a virtual machine. By emulating the
Intel VT-x hardware virtualization extension, the outer level VMM can be aware of
inner level VMM events and optimizes event processing and bypasses unnecessary
levels of indirection such as page table translations.
With the prevalence of hardware virtualization support (e.g. VT-x on the x86
architecture), there emerges system research that attempts to use VT-x for purposes
other than virtualization. For example, Belay et al. (2012) proposed using hard-
ware virtualization support to expose kernel level primitives to applications so that
they can manage privileged CPU features such as page tables and achieve faster
performance.
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2.2 Record and replay
Hypervisor-based fault tolerance (Bressoud and Schneider (1996)) describes the basic
principles and ideas behind virtual machine record and replay. Record and replay
for a virtual machine requires that the replayed stream of instructions match the
recorded stream of instructions. In order to ensure such properties, one has to resort
to hardware counters which count the number of instructions executed, to correctly
intercept the guest execution before reaching the point of external event injection.
Record and replay had been mainly used as a tool to debug or provide fault
tolerance. Revirt (Dunlap et al. (2002)) describes an implementation of record and
replay on a UMLinux host with low execution and storage overhead for the record
and replay process. It utilizes the hardware branch counters to facilitate the injection
of external events during replay. The authors verify the correctness of the record and
replay and establish its usefulness in analyzing security issues on the system.
Debugging operating systems with time-traveling virtual machines (King et al.
(2005)) implements a record and replay framework integrated into GDB to log and
debug the entire operating system and allows fast forwarding between checkpoints.
Operating system debugging is a challenging problem due to the OS running directly
on the hardware and it being very difficult to reproduce the sequence of events
leading up to the crash. Record and replay with interleaved checkpoints solves these
difficulties while allowing non-intrusive attachment to the OS from an external point
of view.
Live migration of virtual machine based on full system trace and replay (Liu et al.
(2009)) describes a VM migration system using checkpointing and recording the trace
of the virtual machine during migration, which allows for very little downtime and
reduced network bandwidth consumption.
Multi-processor record and replay share some similarities with the work we are
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about to present, because the sharing of memory space requires that the implemen-
tation is able to handle the interleaving of memory access from different processors.
Dunlap et al. (2008) discusses the problem of memory sharing in multi-processor
record and replay and solves this issue by using hardware page protection to log
the interleaved memory accesses. Respec (Lee et al. (2010)) implements an online
record and replay that efficiently handles multiprocessor record and replay. It logs
synchronization operations which should guarantee that most of the replay is correct.
In the event that these operation logs fail to provide a correct replay, detected by
deviations from the observed register and memory state, it uses a more stringent
method of serializing the thread and logging the scheduling order.
Crosscut (Chow et al. (2010)) implements a selective replay system that can
pick out or delete information from the replay log to preserve privacy. By using
introspection into the VM on a process level or reflection by the system interpreter,
it is able to tailor the replay into specific needs, such as removing a sensitive string
from the log, or only replaying a specific process.
In Chapter 4, we focus on single processor record and replay, and the techni-
cal challenges of implementing on platforms without precise hardware performance
counters.
2.3 Flash storage virtualization and log structured file systems
Bergmann and the Linaro Project (Linaro (2001); Bergmann (2011)) studied the
performance of SD cards and tried to understand the intrinsics of the FTL and why
it is slow to write non-seqential small blocks. They propose kernel level changes to
improve the performance of file systems on SD cards.
Desnoyers (2013) is another nice summary of the intrinsic characteristics in design
and implementation of flash storage devices. It describes basic parameters such as
page and block size, read/write/erase speed etc. and how they interact with each
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other and are limited by the size and cost of the flash device.
While other types of flash storage had been studied, for example, El Maghraoui
et al. (2010); Saxena and Swift (2010); Rajimwale et al. (2009); Agrawal et al. (2008)
on SSDs; Nath and Gibbons (2010) on Compact Flash (CF) cards; Bouganim et al.
(2009); Birrell et al. (2007) on USB flash drives, SD cards had received very little
attention perhaps due to the assumption that they are not used as key backing stores
for important workloads such as virtual machine images. Without publicly available
SD cards implementation details, it is unclear whether the result from these related
work can be applied to SD cards.
Log structured file systems were proposed to address the I/O bottleneck caused
by fast CPU and slow disks (Rosenblum and Ousterhout (1991)). A similar scenario
exists when we use SD cards as the storage media on mobile devices. The Cloud-
burst project (Bartels and Mann (2001)) uses log structured file systems to speed up
accesses on NOR flash chips.
Recently as smartphones start to become a force to reckon with in everyday
computing, there has emerged research that study the performance of smartphone
storage. Jeong et al. (2013) studies the performance of Android applications and
achieve significant performance increase with the combination of journaling file sys-
tem and smarter meta-data flushes. Another example is Kim et al. (2012) which
identifies the randomness of Android applications′ I/O characteristics and proposed
improvements such as improved hardware, RAID over SD and log based file systems.
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3Virtualization using breakpoint tracing
Building a virtual machine on legacy architectures with little to no hardware vir-
tualization support presents significant challenges. Without hardware virtualization
extensions, the traditional way of implementing virtualization is architecture specific.
We present an alternative highly portable way of implementing virtualization using
hardware breakpoints geared towards these legacy architectures, such as mobile and
embedded systems, which feature non-x86 cores.
3.1 Introduction
Virtualization has witnessed a recent re-emergence on commodity x86 systems and
evolved into many products and implementations. The first x86 hypervisors used
binary translation to implement virtualization, and it had been the predominant full
system virtualization technique until hardware support was introduced on the x86
architecture. As mobile platforms are getting faster and becoming more resource
rich over the years, virtualization had found its uses there in supporting multiple
mobile identities and possibly in the future, ARM clouds and servers. Up until now,
ARM virtualization had been using paravirtualization for the most part, with Xen
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on ARM (Hwang et al. (2008)) and the VMware Mobile Virtual Platform (Barr et al.
(2010)) being prominent examples.
We first address the various challenges found in binary translations on x86 and
ARM and then propose a uniform solution for all platforms that have very limited
hardware support for virtualization.
3.2 Binary translation
In order to run a non-paravirtualized guest, it is essential that we need to be able
to virtualize the guest binary without modifying the source code of the guest OS.
When the guest is virtualized, it does not have direct control over the physical
machine, and therefore runs at user mode privileges. However, there are instructions
from the guest binary that would silently fail if they run at user mode privileges,
meaning that those instructions do not produce the desired result and do not raise
an exception. They are called sensitive instructions which need to be taken care of
by the virtual machine monitor before the guest can be virtualized. The idea behind
binary translation is to rewrite the guest binary into other instructions that produce
the desired behavior of the sensitive instructions. However, another requirement
for fully virtualized guest is that the host must be totally transparent to the guest.
Certain parts of the system, such as memory or CPU registers, must be the same as
if they are on a physical machine. Therefore the guest must not discover that certain
unmapped virtual memory is actually mapped and reads as unknown data, or that
a different binary is being executed when the guest reads the code it is currently
executing (typically occurs during self checksumming or self modifying). Because
binary translated code lives at a different virtual address space than the original
code, it is essential that the memory where the translated code resides is unreadable
to itself. In other words, we require an execute-only mechanism for binary translation
to work successfully.
13
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Figure 3.1: Binary translation on x86 using segmentation to implement execute-
only mechanism
On the x86 architecture, we can achieve this requirement using segmentation
techniques. Translated code runs at a different address than the original code. Since
the translated code must not be able to read itself, it is place beyond the virtual
address of the original code, and the segment CS (code segment) is set to the region
of translated code′s virtual space so that the translated code can execute. But for all
load/store memory accesses, which use DS (data segment) and other segments, we
set those segments to only include the original code′s virtual address. In this way,
if any code tries to read the translated code area, it will fault (Figure 3.1) (Bugnion
et al. (2012)).
This solution is necessary because page protections are not sufficient to guarantee
the property we seek. Both the translated code and original code are under user mode
and belong to user pages, if they can be executed, they can also be read.
The same problem exists on ARM where we would like to hide the translated
code from itself. Unfortunately ARM does not support segmentation. We have
to accomplish this using the LDRT instruction. This instruction loads a memory
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Figure 3.2: Binary translation on ARM using LDRT to implement execute-only
mechanism
address into a register using user mode privilege. That is to say, if the memory
address specified happens to be in a user page, it will fault. It is traditionally
used by kernels to simulate a user mode access so that it can check whether certain
memory addresses (usually from some parameters passed from user mode processes)
are accessible by user mode or not. Using this instruction, we make translated code
execute in privileged mode and all memory loads (LDR instructions) are translated
into LDRT instructions. The pages are set so that the original code is in user mode
and the translated code is in privileged mode. If any of the translated code tries to
read itself using LDR instruction on the address of the program counter (PC), the
corresponding translated LDRT instruction will fault (Figure 3.2).
Although this mechanism accomplishes the job, it has security implications be-
cause it puts a burden on the binary translator that the translated code must be
bullet-proof in security. Even the slightest bug opens up the potential for a fatal
attack from the guest which can then take control of the host system.
Other than the above two platforms mentioned, binary translation is difficult to
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do under x86 64 bit because it does not support segmentation. If ARM did not have
LDRT instructions, binary translation would also be hard to implement effciently on
it. Overall, binary translation relies heavily on architecture-specific features. It is
not possible to apply a successful prototype from one type of CPU to another type of
CPU. For example, both MIPS architecture and PowerPC architecture lack a reliable
way to virtualize without hardware virtualization support.
3.3 Breakpoint tracing
We propose that, by requiring hardware debugging breakpoints, we are able to im-
plement virtualization in a new way without relying on an execute-only mechanisms
which some architectures lack. Our implementation can be applied to any architec-
ture with hardware debugging breakpoints.
In order to implement virtualization on CPUs with no hardware virtualization
support, we need to be able to handle sensitive instructions by emulation. Because
we would like a virtualized guest to run in an unprivileged mode with unmodified
kernels, those instructions that normally operate under privileged mode must either
yield the same result, or be emulated.
Our implementation traps sensitive instruction using hardware breakpoints. x86
and other CISC architectures have variable instruction lengths, and there are maybe
hundreds of sensitive instructions in a kernel yet only 4-8 hardware breakpoints in
any given CPU. Therefore it is necessary that we know which sensitive instructions
are about to be executed.
In order to achieve this, we use dynamic analysis to construct the control flow
graph (CFG) of the guest kernel. The CFG analysis identifies points of interests
(POIs) which are defined as branches and sensitive instructions. We can then ask
the question “given N number of breakpoints and a control flow graph with points
of interests, where in the control flow graph must those breakpoints be placed?”
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Figure 3.3: Guest control flow graph analysis
The objective here is to ensure that we place hardware breakpoints on appropriate
places so that we trap all the sensitive instructions and maintain control over the
kernel code flow. For example, if the analysis result is as shown in Figure 3.3, and
suppose we have 3 available hardware breakpoints in the CPU, we have to place
the breakpoints on the sensitive instruction, the pointer branch 1 instruction and
pointer branch 2 instruction respectively. However if we only have 2 available
hardware breakpoints in the CPU, we have to place the breakpoints on conditional
branch 2 instruction and pointer branch 1 instruction respectively, and execute
the guest until one of the breakpoints is triggered to determine what to do next. If we
reach the pointer branch 1 instruction, we need to perform further CFG analysis;
if we reach the conditional branch 2 instruction, we need to place the breakpoints
on the sensitive instruction and pointer branch 2 instruction. Also, if we ever
reach a pointer branch instruction, we turn on single stepping before executing the
next guest instruction and single step once to determine the position of the next
executed instruction before the CFG analysis.
Our breakpoint tracing approach has several advantages over prior approaches.
First, it can run an unmodified guest kernel. Second, hardware breakpoints are
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a more common CPU feature than both hardware virtualization extensions and
execute-only mechanisms. Third, this technique is simple and cross-platform. Fourth,
our approach may have a security advantage over binary translation on ARM due to
having no guest code running in privileged mode. The trade-off is a speed penalty
due to more instructions being trapped than with binary translation or hardware
virtualization.
3.4 Implementation
In this section we describe, step by step, how the breakpoint tracing virtual machine
monitor is implemented and discuss some of the engineering challenges in the imple-
mentation. We implemented both the x86 and ARM version of this technique. We
will focus on the x86 version during our elaboration because it is more complete and
complex compared to the ARM version, and is also the version we will focus for our
experiments.
The virtual machine monitor (VMM) implementation manages two worlds. The
host world is the environment of the physical machine. The guest world is the
environment of the guest emulated machine. The VMM is responsible for setting up
and switching to the guest world.
The first problem we face is the need to choose the host OS and guest OS. A
Linux host and guest is ideal for our implementation because it is open source and
easy to debug. In theory any other host/guest combination is possible, and the
architecture should support porting our implementation to another host or guest
with ease. We choose C as the programming language for its portability. No matter
what host we choose to run on, we need the processor’s privileged mode access
because at the very least, we need to be able to manage the CPU states such as page
tables on the physical machine. Therefore, on a Linux host, we build the VMM into
a loadable kernel module (LKM) to bootstrap the VMM’s privileged mode access.
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This bootstrapper code is host specific and if we are on Windows, the bootstrapper
needs to be a kernel device driver.
The next problem we face is to design a guest world memory layout. The challenge
here is that the guest world must have access to all virtual address space. A natural
solution is to have a fresh, empty page table for the guest and have the VMM switch
to the guest page table before beginning guest’s execution. However, on almost
all architectures the “switch page table” instruction must have a valid virtual page
mapping on both the current executing page table and the target page table it’s
about to switch to. Therefore we have to “steal” some pages (we call these bridge
pages) from the guest virtual address space so that the switcher code for the guest
can be run within those virtual pages. However, the guest is free to access the virtual
addresses of the bridge pages because it has no idea that it is running on a virtual
machine. One possible solution to this conflict is to emulate instructions that refer
bridge pages. However, we can dodge or emulate the rare conflicts by moving the
switcher code to another virtual address if the guest requests access to those pages.
As a consequence, we would like to choose some virtual address space high up in
the 0xd0000000 - 0xffffffff area for our switcher code so that dodging rarely happens.
Also, the switcher code must be positional independent which means it is able to run
at any virtual address without modification (i.e. contains no relocation). Figure 3.4
describes the host/guest memory layout.
The general flow of execution of the virtual machine is as follows:
Bootstrap the guest
Repeat {
VMM preprocesses the guest and set breakpoints, if necessary
VMM switches to the guest world to begin execution
Interrupts/faults stop guest execution
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Figure 3.4: Virtual machine memory layout
VMM handles interrupts/faults
}
On x86, we bootstrap the guest in the same way a physical machine would boot-
strap an operating system when powered on. We load the boot sector of the boot
disk (in our case, the floppy drive) at address 0:7c00, and set the guest’s instruction
pointer (IP) to 0:7c00 to begin execution. The guest boot sector would then per-
form the rest of the system initialization including loading the operating system and
executing it just as it does on a physical machine. The VMM’s job is to service all
interrupts and faults generated by the guest after the bootstrap.
Because the guest has no direct control over the physical machine, any interrupt
generated during guest execution is actually meant for the host. The VMM should
simply re-deliver the interrupt to the host by re-asserting or re-triggering the inter-
rupt while it’s in the host world. When a fault occurs in the guest world, it can be
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one of the following types: page fault, execution fault and breakpoint fault.
When a page fault occurs, it is either handled by the VMM’s shadow page table
handler (described later), or delivered to the guest. When an execution fault occurs,
it means that either the guest executed certain instructions that cannot be executed
under user mode (i.e. requires VMM emulation) or the guest has a true fault, in which
case we need to deliver the fault to the guest. When a breakpoint fault occurs, the
VMM needs to update its view of the control flow graph and determine the next set
of breakpoints to place for our breakpoint tracing technique. Figure 3.5 shows the
general flow of the VMM and how various components interact with each other.
In order to perform the functionality we have described, the VMM needs to keep
track of all the guest states. The guest states are abstracted into a “world” data
structure. Within the world structure, we maintain all guest register states and
shadowed register states. We also keep a list of guest assigned pages and their corre-
sponding mappings for VMM memory management. Emulated virtual device states
are also kept for VMM device handlers. Figure 3.6 illustrates the data structure.
Next, we describe in detail each component of our VMM.
3.4.1 World switcher
To switch from the host world to the guest world, the host operating system calls
into the VMM process to initiate execution of the guest. The world switcher con-
text switches the processor from host world to the guest world and execute guest
code directly without any modification. In addition to switching the page tables, we
also need to switch the interrupt handling vectors so that when the guest takes an
interrupt or a fault, it is the VMMs fault handler instead of the hosts fault handler
that takes over. On the x86 architecture, we need to switch the global descriptor ta-
ble (GDT), which is a data structure for describing segmentation, and the interrupt
descriptor table (IDT) which is a data structure for describing exception handlers,
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Figure 3.5: Guest world event flow
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and the task register (TR), which provides information about current task and priv-
ileged mode stack position. On the x86 architecture, the world switch procedure is
as follows:
Disable interrupts
Save all host normal registers
Save all host control registers (Page table base, GDT, IDT, TR)
Load guest shadow GDT
Load guest shadow IDT
In guest GDT, set guest TR not busy
Load guest TR
Load all guest normal registers
Load all guest control registers (Shadow page table base)
We are in guest context
Return to guest user mode using IRET
When an interrupt or fault is taken during guests execution, it traps to the
handlers specified by the VMM instead of the hosts. A CPU fault is not host bound
and requires VMM handling, with an interrupt it is required that we re-deliver the
vector to the host. Upon taking a fault or interrupt, the fault handler does the
following steps:
Save all guest normal registers
Restore all host normal registers
Restore host page table
Restore host GDT
Restore host IDT
In host GDT, set host TR not busy
Load host TR
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We are now in host context, resuming kernel module execution
After the world switch back to the host, we are in host world and can access all
host system functions and memory.
3.4.2 Guest memory management
Guest memory is managed by shadow page tables. Whenever a guest attempts to
load a page table base register, it triggers a fault, enabling the VMM to intercept
and perform appropriate actions. The guest is not aware of the host address space
and believes that it is running on a physical machine. Therefore, it maps its vir-
tual address (VA) to physical address (PA). It is the job of the VMM to translate
guest physical addresses into host machine physical addresses (MA) (Figure 3.7).
Therefore, whenever the guest attempts to load a page table, the VMM intercepts
and supplies the CPU with a shadow page table instead. The shadow page table
initially has no guest specified mappings. Therefore, virtual address accesses fault
into the VMM. The VMM then checks the guests page table to determine if the
fault is caused by the VM not mapping the pages correctly in the shadow page table
(i.e. a hidden fault), or if the fault is caused by the guest not setting up a mapping
correctly (i.e. a guest fault). Hidden faults are handled by the VMM without guests
knowledge. Guest faults are delivered to the guest vector set by the guest IDT.
The guest OS frequently changes page tables and issues TLB-flush instructions
to make the changes visible to the hardware. The VM needs to update the shadow
page table accordingly as well when the guest flushes the TLB. TLB flush instructions
sometimes flush specific virtual address within the guest, but most of the time, the
guest issues an instruction to flush the entire TLB during process switch. A naive
implementation would need to clear the entire corresponding shadow page table
because it would have no idea of which entries of the guest page tables are updated.
This naive implementation has huge performance issues because a new and empty
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shadow page table triggers many hidden faults. In order to improve performance,
we write-protect the guest page table pages whenever the guest flushes the TLB.
During guest execution, if the guest page table pages are written, the VMM removes
the write protection and mark the corresponding shadow page table entries changed.
The next time the guest issues a TLB flush instruction, the VMM would only need
to clear the pages that had been marked as changed.
One additional optimization for our shadow page table implementation is opti-
mizing the root page table. Purging a root page table in the corresponding shadow
page table because the guest version was changed (write protection broken) is a very
costly action. Since we do not know which entries were modified, we have to purge
all links to the second level page table in our shadow page table root page which
causes massive amount of hidden page faults later on. We optimize the root page
table by copying the entire root page (4K in size) and compare the entries one by one
if the write protection is broken. We do not purge the entries that were unchanged
and therefore save some hidden faults from occuring.
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3.4.3 Breakpoint tracing
In order to perform dynamic analysis of the guest kernel, we build a generic break-
point tracing framework. The framework consists of three parts: decoder, control
flow graph generator and breakpoint tracing plan builder.
The decoder decodes guest kernel code starting from the current program counter.
It is necessary to perform dynamic analysis because the x86 architecture has a vari-
able instruction length, and it is difficult to determine instruction boundaries un-
til the code is about to be executed. The decoder marks certain instructions into
POIs which are tagged into the following categories: conditional branches, pointer
branches, unconditional branches, sensitive instructions, and unrecognized instruc-
tions. In order to avoid having to repeatedly decode the same encountered PC, we
cache the decoded result and write protect the code page. We can find out what
type of instruction the current PC has, by indexing into the cache using the PC. We
do not have to perform decoding again as long as the write protection is not broken.
The control flow graph (CFG) generator generates directed graphs that represent
relationships among POIs. Conditional branches have two connected nodes that rep-
resent taken and not-taken branches. Unconditional branches have one connected
node that represents the branch target. Pointer branches, sensitive instructions and
unrecognized instructions have no connected nodes because the next instruction that
executes afterwards can be an arbitrary instruction.
The breakpoint tracing plan builder builds a breakpoint plan from the given
POI and determines on which POIs the breakpoints should be placed so that the
VMM does not lose track of the guests execution, and that all sensitive instructions
are trapped when executed. The plan builder uses a simple breadth first search
algorithm to determine where to place the breakpoints given a CFG:
Total_Available_Breakpoints = 4
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foreach Node in CFG
Node.visited = false
BT_Breakpoints(Current_Executing_Node)
function BT_Breakpoints(Node)
if (Node.visited) return
Node.visited = true
if (Total_Available_Breakpoints == 0) return
switch(Node.Type)
case UNCONDITIONAL_BRANCH:
BT_Breakpoints(Node.Next)
break
case POINTER_BRANCH:
case SENSITIVE_INSTRUCTION:
Place_Breakpoints(Node)
Total_Available_Breakpoints--
break
case CONDITIONAL_BRANCH:
if (Total_Available_breakpoints == 1)
Place_Breakpoints(Node)
Total_Available_Breakpoints--
else
BT_Breakpoints(Node.Left)
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BT_Breakpoints(Node.Right)
break
if (Total_Available_Breakpoints == 0) return
end_of_function
When we receive a breakpoint fault during guest execution, we can determine
where the guest has executed to in the CFG and perform the appropriate action.
If we arrive at a pointer branch, we need to single step once to determine the next
instruction to execute before performing CFG analysis. If we arrive at a sensitive
instruction, we need to emulate the instruction and then continue the CFG analysis.
If we arrive at a conditional branch, we simply perform more CFG analysis.
3.4.4 Guest side monitor
The world switch procedure we described is very expensive because in addition to an
interrupt entry/exit, it flushes all TLB entries and reloads all other system registers
(such as GDT and IDT on x86). The extra overhead from the world switch can
cost a huge amount of CPU cycles equaling several thousands of instructions. In
order to minimize the cost of world switching, we move some of the VMM code to
the guest side. By stealing a virtual address not used by the guest, we map some
of the exception processing code into the guest space as a monitor, and modify our
exception handler to jump to the monitor code to be processed first. We avoid the
cost of world switch and only take the cost of an interrupt entry/exit if the monitor is
able to handle the exception. Currently in our implementation, we are able to handle
most of the breakpoint exceptions and most of the privileged instruction faults. We
only save a minimum amount of registers required for the monitor code to work, i.e.
all the normal x86 registers and DS/ES segment registers. Note that it is possible for
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the monitor to page fault, for example, if the monitor is trying to read the current
guest stack and it happens to be unmapped. When the monitor faults, we have to
fall back to the host world handler to deal with the event because we cannot call host
system functions such as mmap from the monitor side, which is in the guest world.
Monitor faults are detected by misconfigured stacks on exception entry. When an
exception is triggered from the guest code (user mode privilege level), the stack is set
to a fixed location defined by our VMM. However, when monitor code is running, the
stack is not at that location, and when it faults, the stack remains the same because
x86 doesnt change stack pointer if no privilege level switch occurs (the monitor is
running at system mode privilege level). When the fault is detected, we simply reset
the stack to the fixed location and proceed as if the monitor code was never run.
With the monitor code installed, the general flow of the exception handler looks like:
x86 IDT Entry:
//the first item on the stack is the interrupt number
push $int_number
//save all registers
pusha
//DS and ES are required for C code to work
push ds
push es
//are we handling interrupt 1 (breakpoint exception)?
cmp $0x1, 40(%esp)
jne 1f
monitor_bt()
1:
//is the stack correctly aligned?
30
cmp $stack_location, %esp
jne 2f
//nope, the monitor faulted. Reset stack
mov $stack_location, %esp
2:
push fs
push gs
//save additional segment registers
//continue with the rest of the world switch
...
Note that because it is possible to fault within the monitor, the monitor code
must be written with such a restriction in mind: The monitor must not modify a
permanent status (i.e. a status variable stored in the world structure) of the guest
and then faults. For example, the following monitor code has a bug:
if (world->poi->type == CONDITIONAL_BRANCH) {
world->poi = world->poi->next;
unsigned char *instruction = *(world->guest_regs->ip);
The above code would bug because we modify a permanent status of the guest
world (POI) before fetching the currently executing instruction. However, such fetch-
ing action can page fault and therefore we can be left with a partially modified world
state.
3.4.5 I/O
In order for the guest to interact with the virtualized environment, the VMM must
implement basic I/O devices for the guest to use. We implement text console, key-
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board, floppy drive and hard drive on x86, and for our ARM implementation, only
the serial console is implemented. The guest OS (Linux, for example) can interact
with these virtualized devices using the same unmodified drivers as on any other
physical machine. On a physical machine, an operating system outputs to the screen
by writing to the video cards memory buffer. On x86 if we are only concerned with
text mode (i.e. 80x25 characters per screen) the buffer is located at physical address
0xb8000. We build a ncurse window that directly map guests screen buffer pages
to our ncurse window so that any time a guest writes to its screen buffer, the result
is reflected in our ncurse window. This window is the primary channel to observe
and verify that the guest output.
In order for the guest to receive user input, we implement and expose an AT
keyboard device to the guest OS. The keyboard interface on x86 is I/O ports 0x60
and 0x64. Whenever a key is pressed, an interrupt is generated on a vector specified
by the guest. When the guest receives the interrupt delivery, it checks the keyboard
I/O ports to read in any pending key presses as scancodes. The scancodes are then
translated into actual keys. The VMM needs to translate the key inputs received
from the ncurse window into scancodes and emulate passing the scancodes to the
guest.
We also implement a floppy drive controller and a hard disk controller as the
storage devices for the guest. The guest submits requests to read the disk via I/O
commands, identifying which cylinder, head, and sector (CHS) it wants to read, and
on which physical address it wants to save the results. The guest then may run
other code while it waits for an interrupt signaling the completion of the I/O. The
VMM, upon receiving the I/O commands, performs the I/O by reading the virtual
disk image and modify the guest physical page with the I/O results before injecting
the interrupt into the guest.
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3.5 Experiments and discussions
In order to evaluate our breakpoint tracing technique, we engineer a proof of concept
virtual machine monitor on both the x86 architecture and the ARM architecture.
The ARM version is verified to be able to boot an unmodified Linux 3.4 guest on a
Pandaboard ES. However, since there are more VMM implementations available on
x86 for comparison, and also because it is easier on x86 to debug and analyze the
performance of our implementation, the rest of the section will focus on experiments
and analysis done on the x86 architecture. The test environment we use for the host
is a Linux 3.4 kernel (SMP disabled) running on Intel Core 2 Duo processor with
4G memory. The guest is an unmodified Linux 3.4 kernel with necessary floppy disk
and hard disk drivers. We compare our performance against QEMU and VirtualBox
running on the same host using the same guest. We disable Intel VT-x on the
BIOS and the QEMU/VirtualBox configurations to make sure we are making a fair
comparison.
We evaluate our work to answer the following questions:
1. What is the overhead of the implementation?
2. Where does the overhead come from?
3. Can the implementation be faster?
In order to evaluate our implementation on CPU virtualization performance, we
first run several micro-benchmarks containing critical kernel mode only workloads.
Then, we run some application benchmarks to determine how our implementation
would perform running real applications. Table 3.1 lists the experiments we run.
The micro-benchmarks demonstrate the worst case CPU virtualization overhead
for our implementation. The majority of the overhead comes from two categories, the
monitor itself for handling the breakpoint tracing and mode transitions (i.e. world
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Table 3.1: Evaluated experiments
Experiment name
¯
Experiment detail
¯
getuid getuid() syscall 10000 times.
forkexec fork() and exec() a null program 10000 times.
process switch Create two processes and ping-pong between them
1000000 times.
thread switch Create two threads and ping-pong between them
100000 times.
segv Triggers SIGSEGV 1500000 times.
gzip gzip a file 1M in size with random data generated
from urandom.
gcc bzip2.c gcc the source file of bzip2. cold run is the first run
while hot run is the second run without rebooting.
dd 10M Run dd with source as /dev/zero and destination
as the hard drive, copying 1M block size 10 times.
python computation A Python benchmark that solves NQueens.
switches and monitor exits/entries). World switches are very costly as demonstrated
by the results without a guest side monitor. The getuid experiment is special among
all the experiments because it barely has any kernel mode code to execute before
returning the UID result to the user mode code. Therefore it measures entirely the
cost of guest mode switch. There are hardly any monitor overhead in this experiment
and all the overhead comes from world switch. The reason that we are unable to
handle everything within the monitor is because guest mode switching and page
faults require read/write of the guest page table and shadow page table, which was
not yet implemented. However, in theory, after we are able to fully handle all faults
inside the guest-side monitor, we could reach about 30x overhead on the experiments
other than getuid and near native performance on getuid, based on only counting
the overhead of guest side monitor and the exception cost in our micro-benchmarks
experiment.
The application benchmark shows that we are faster than QEMU in most cases.
This is because QEMU is running as an emulator without KVM acceleration and is
translating and compiling every single instruction. For application benchmarks, our
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Figure 3.8: Micro-benchmarks result
implementation is closer to VirtualBox when less I/O is involved in the experiment
while having considerable overheads when I/O is involved due to two factors. First,
I/O instructions executed by the kernel traps and are not handled by the guest side
monitor in our current implementation and therefore has to involve a world switch.
Second, I/O from the guest requires execution of some guest kernel code at which our
implementation is slower by comparison. For CPU intensive tasks, for example the
hot run of gcc (much less I/O than the cold run) and python computation benchmark,
our implementation is much closer closer to native and binary translation.
Lastly, because currently the ARM version of our implementation does not have a
guest side monitor, we examine how the implementation could perform if fully ported
to ARM platform by identifying and measuring some key costs of CPU virtualization.
35
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
dd 10M gcc bzip2.c cold gcc bzip2.c hot python computation gzip 1M random data
native btvm qemu virtualbox
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The major overhead our implementation encounters is the world switch cost and
exception cost. We measure what the costs of these operations are on both x86 and
ARM. The world switch costs are measured with timed 10000 world switches in our
implementation. The exception costs are measured with timed 10000 breakpoint
exceptions. Both experiments are set up by running a null guest and placing a
breakpoint on the first instruction that is about to be executed, therefore causing the
guest to immediately trap and bounce back to the host or the monitor, where we time
the start and end of the experiment by reading the processor time stamp counter. We
compare it against a baseline of a totally empty function, and a baseline of a function
that saves all normal processor registers and load all normal processor registers inside
the function. The baseline of a function with register saves and register loads is a
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Figure 3.10: World switch and exception costs
more fair comparison because it is practically impossible to engineer the guest side
monitor or the host fault handler without register saves and loads. These experiments
demonstrate that,
1. Relatively speaking, compared to function calls, it is much slower to handle an
exception on x86 than on ARM. We have no exact proof as to why this is the
case, but an educated guess suggests that ARM exceptions only trigger two
banked register swap and a mode change before executing the fault handler,
and all of these state changes involve only the CPU, whereas on x86, the CPU
needs to read the IDT and TR to determine the exception handler’s location,
with all the data structures involved in this transition residing in memory.
Also, another possible cause is the difference on CPU microarchitectures such
as shorter pipeline length.
37
2. Relatively speaking, compared to exception handling, it is much slower on
ARM to do a world switch, due to the fact that world switch on ARM does
a lot more compared to its relatively simple exception handling procedure. It
has to do a TLB flush, exception vector reset and mode stack save/load. As a
consequence, it is utmost essential for the implementation to have a guest side
monitor on ARM.
In all, our implementation can be faster by implementing a more thorough guest
side monitor handling I/O and many other boundary cases such as guest privilege
mode exit/entry. Also, an ARM version would have a slightly better performance
relatively speaking, because the guest side monitor are less expensive to trap to
compared to the x86 architecture.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined many virtualization techniques, especially binary trans-
lation, on x86 and ARM architectures, and discussed why it is difficult to apply
existing binary translation techniques to mobile devices. We proposed a uniform
solution for both architectures using hardware breakpoints and built a virtual ma-
chine using this technique. We examined various engineering challenges in building
such a prototype. We performed several experiments to discuss the feasibility of this
approach compared to existing binary translation techniques. We broke down the
overhead of our approach and analyzed the fundamental architectural cost of world
switches and exceptions.
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4Record and Replay without hardware counter
support
Record and replay provides important functionality for debugging virtual machines
and fault tolerance. However, this function cannot be easily implemented on the
ARM architecture due to a lack of precise hardware counters. We propose an al-
ternative implementation for paravirtualized guests and introduce a corresponding
alternative concept of correctness for the replay. We discuss how the correctness of
the replay can be guaranteed in general and in the special cases of signals and shared
memory, and show that the overhead of this approach is reasonable.
4.1 Introduction
System virtualization dates back to the 70s where it first appeared on IBM 360/370
hardware (Goldberg (1974)). It took off rapidly in the last two decades with efficient
and useful products on the x86 architecture, and found its way into data centers as an
indispensable tool for cost effective computing. Contemporary virtualization research
and industry efforts have had an x86 focus. In recent years, as CPU hardware
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continued to improve, virtualization has been extended to platforms other than x86,
and attempts have been made on the ARM architecture to implement virtualization,
most notably VMware Horizon Mobile, which is a paravirtualization solution for
ARMv7. The vastly improved processing power and capabilities of ARM CPUs
motivates virtualization, since they are now capable of handling large memory sizes
and numbers of cores, comparable to those in the desktop environment.
Record and replay is an integral part of the virtual machine functionality on a
virtualization platform. It enables debugging and fault tolerance of virtual machine
guests. Naturally, the question of how to implement record and replay on the ARM
architecture arises, and it is more challenging than on x86 due to limited hardware
support.
Record and replay takes a virtual machine image and recorded actions as input,
and generates an output of virtual machine state as if those actions are done on
the virtual machine in the time and sequence they were recorded. The output state
is deterministic, a feature which is essential to debugging and fault tolerance of
the guest VM. On x86, record and replay is implemented using an interpolation of
program counter (PC) and processor hardware counters to pinpoint an exact point
of injection of external events. The primary issue on ARM is the lack of precise
hardware counters that supports this style of record and replay implementation.
We propose an alternative implementation on a paravirtualized mobile virtualiza-
tion platform using only minor modifications to the guest kernel and virtual machine
monitor (VMM). We also propose a different type of replay correctness than that
used in traditional x86 implementation. We relax the traditional definition of “in-
struction by instruction” correctness and show that we can still achieve deterministic
and observationally equivalent results in the end.
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4.2 X86 record and replay implementation
Ultimately, in order for a replay to be correct (and useful), the sequence of observed
guest events, namely, those generated by the replay must match those generated by
the recording. In addition, the same guest state must be arrived at by the end of
the replay. In other words, any record and replay implementation must guarantee
that the result of the replay is deterministic. Given a fixed sequence and timing of
external events, a replay of those events must arrive at the same result.
In order to guarantee such correct replay, we need to record all non-deterministic
events (i.e. interrupt and interrupt state) as well as all input results, which are
essential to reconstructing the events and I/O during replay. With this information
recorded, a record and replay implementation must then guarantee replay correctness
by carefully injecting the recorded events.
On x86, we guarantee replay correctness by having the replay execute the same
sequence of instructions as was executed in the recording, and injecting external
events at the same instruction as was recorded. In other words, we need to find
the same instruction where external events are injected by carefully advancing the
execution of the guest virtual machine until we arrive at such point.
Normally, there are only two ways to advance and capture the execution of in-
structions. Either a breakpoint is placed on the desired instruction, or single stepping
is engaged and instructions execute one at a time. Both of these methods are slow
to use. The first method of placing a breakpoint might seem fine in many situa-
tions, but suppose we have a loop in the execution path and the breakpoint is within
the loop, it would take as many breakpoints traps as iterations to find the actual
injection point, e.g.
for i = 1 to 10000 do
check_for_input(i);
41
end
Fortunately, we can utilize hardware branch counters on x86 to solve this issue.
x86 hardware branch counters provides an accurate count of how many branches
have been executed since the last specified point of execution, and an interrupt can
be set to trigger upon reaching a predefined number of branches executed by the
CPU.
With the assistance of hardware branch counters, we can advance instructions
during replay without resorting to the two slow methods aforementioned. The num-
ber of branches executed between each two consecutive events are recorded, and
we only have to set the interrupt to trigger upon reaching the recorded number of
branches, at which point we can simply place a breakpoint on the desired instruction
and not have to worry about reaching the breakpoint multiple times, because the
first time such breakpoint triggers is the point of injection we require.
4.3 Record and replay on ARM
Record and replay on ARM cannot be implemented in the same way as it is done
on x86. ARM platforms do not have architecturally guaranteed accurate processor
counters for use (ARM (2001)). We argue that we can relax certain aspects of the
record and replay implementation on ARM and still produce a useful implementation
with reasonable speed.
In order for a record and replay implementation to be useful, it must guarantee
that the result of the replay is deterministic. I.e., given a fixed sequence and timing
of external events, a replay of those events must arrive at the same result, which is
measurable by the output and state of the virtual machine. We call such a record
and replay implementation logically correct.
x86 record and replay implementations inject external events at the same instruc-
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tion as was occurred in the recording, therefore producing literally the same stream of
instructions executed during replay, ensuring correctness. We can however, relax this
requirement, and not require a literal reproduction of the same instruction stream,
while still producing a logically correct output, thereby satisfying the usefulness of
the record and replay implementation.
The fundamental insight we present here comes from an important observation.
Usually, the challenges for record and replay on any platform is how to manage incom-
ing non-deterministic events potentially occuring at any guest instruction. Previous
research has focused on how to pinpoint the particular instruction where these events
occur. However, if we examine how some operating systems work, such as Linux,
and how user processes interacts with the kernel, we can make the key observation
that when such events occur, usually they do not affect state and execution of user
processes. In other words, most of the time, when those events occur, they neither
are observable by user processes nor impact user processes’ state. For example, if
an interrupt for a keypress occurs in user mode, the kernel processes the interrupt
and records the keypress in some internal kernel buffer, and then may return to user
mode. However, the event handling may make no change to any of the user processes,
assuming no user processes are waiting asynchronously for a keypress. An important
observation is that such events only affect kernel state, and during replay, the point
of injection of such events often does not affect the state of the user process as long
as the sequence of events is respected. In other words, such events can be injected
anywhere in user mode as long as the injection occurs after the previous recorded
event and before the next recorded event. Generally speaking, the vast majority
of the interactions between kernel and user processes are through system calls. We
have comprehensively examined the POSIX API, and other than using signals and
shared memory, which we will discuss later, there are no other methods by which a
process may interact with another process. In other words, if we exclude signals and
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shared memory, between two system calls, if an interrupt occurs, there is no POSIX
API whose result is dependent on the exact position of the instruction where the
interrupt occurs. And if we exclude signals and the case of longjmp call, the pro-
gram flow is deterministic regardless of interrupt occurrence, with the caller always
returning to the next instruction to execute. Such an important observation enables
us to implement a record and replay framework that can disregard the exact point
of interrupt occurrence in most situations. Note that the random number generator
of guest is deterministic between record and replay because the number generated is
based on the sequences of external interrupts and time, which are identical between
record and replay.
In order to maintain logical correctness of the replay, the VMM is made aware
of the distinction between guest kernel and guest user processes. In many cases,
even though a non-deterministic event occurs, it only affects the kernel and not
any of the user processes. In order to guarantee that non-deterministic events are
injected at the same point if such events happen in kernel mode, we modify the
VMM to prohibit non-deterministic event injection unless the kernel calls “wait for
interrupt”(WFI). This modification however, assumes the kernel will be regularly
calling WFI or entering user mode, which, for example, is the case in Linux. This
is a reasonable assumption because a paravirtualized guest provides the opportunity
to ensure this regular invocation of WFI. We also record all the kernel’s interactions
with the VMM and devices, such as any timer or wall clock calls. In this way, we
ensure that any timer or device related handling by the kernel, such as locks and
scheduling decisions, is always the same in replay because the injection point of all
external events are identical between record and replay, at the expense of increased
interrupt latency depending on the type of applications and the system.
Although we have argued that for non-deterministic events, in many cases, a
precise point of injection is either guaranteed (in kernel mode) or not required (in
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user mode), there are cases where an exact point of injection is required. For example,
shared memory and signals require a precise point of injection because, in these cases,
non-deterministic events do affect the state of the user process. For example, if a
SIGALARM occurs due to a timer interrupt, both the kernel and the user process are
affected. The kernel takes the interrupt and is affected in terms of stack, handlers and
randomization pool; the user mode process experiences a PC change (i.e. program
flow change). Another example is if two user processes communicate via shared
memory and a task switch (due to a timer interrupt) occurred, a precise injection is
required because the processes involved must be replayed with the same view of the
shared memory as was recorded.
Figure 4.1 illustrate the cases with signals.
There are three possible scenarios with signals in the guest.
1. An interrupt occurs during a process execution. Guest switches to kernel state.
Signal occurs on the process. The process continues to execute with a different
PC (signal handler).
2. A system call or fault occurs during a process execution. Guest switches to
kernel state. Signal occurs on the process. The process continues to execute
with a different PC (signal handler). This procedure is deterministic therefore
we do not need to be exact.
3. An interrupt occurs during a process execution. Guest switches to kernel state.
The process is terminated. A new process starts with the same page table base.
The new process continues to run (with a different PC, but those two processes
are irrelevant and no signal occurred).
The following sequences of events illustrate some important examples of signals
and how they fall into the categories we mentioned.
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Process 1
Kernel
Interrupt
Signal
PC#1
PC#2
Case #1
Process 1
Kernel
Process 2
PC#1
PC#2
Interrupt
New Process
Case #3
Process 1
Kernel
Syscall/Fault
Signal
PC#1
PC#2
Case #2
Figure 4.1: Signal handling during record and replay
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1. An interrupt occurs during process A execution. Guest switches to kernel state,
schedules another process B to run. Process B signals Process A. This is an
example for the case 1 we mentioned above, which requires a precise point of
injection for the first interrupt with respect to process A.
2. An interrupt occurs while process A executes. It switches to kernel state and
schedules process B. Process B does a system call into kernel. While in B’s
context, an interrupt triggers causing the kernel signaling process A. Process A
is scheduled and execution continues on a different PC. This is an example for
the case 1 and case 2 we mentioned above. The first interrupt requires a precise
point of injection with respect to process A, however the second interrupt does
not require any special handling due to process B syscalling into the kernel to
transition into kernel context.
The following algorithm guarantees detection of signals in these cases:
Maintain:
<Dictionary1>(PageTableBase, usermodePC)
<Dictionary2>(PageTableBase, guest interrupt)
On guest deterministic entries (Faults, Syscalls) into kernel mode:
<Dictionary1>.RemoveKey(PageTableBase)
On guest interrupts:
<Dictionary1>.(PageTableBase) = usermodePC
<Dictionary2>.(PageTableBase) = guest interrupt
On guest return to user mode:
oldPC = <Dictionary1>.(PageTableBase)
if (targetPC != oldPC)
Intr = <Dictionary2>.(PageTableBase)
Intr.MarkAsRequirePreciseInjection()
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Note that case 3 mentioned above will produce false positives under our algorithm.
Due to the rarity of the case and no negative impact with false positives (we provide
a precise point of injection even though a precise injection is not required), we don’t
need to filter them out.
Shared memory requires the same treatment due to memory operation sequenc-
ing. The essence of our approach treats each user process and the kernel as isolated
entities that usually do not affect each other in a non-deterministic manner. Sharing
memory between user processes or user process mmap into kernel space breaks such
isolation. Therefore, it is important that, for example, if an interrupt happens be-
tween process 1 writing to shared memory variable A and process 2 writing to the
same place, that exact ordering is respected. Shared memory can be detected when
two user processes have pages tables that maps to the same page with user mode
writable privileges in anyy mapping, or when the kernel tries to access pages that
are mapped into a user process during interrupt processing.
In either of these two cases when a precise point of injection is required, we use
an optimized hardware breakpoint handler to check for injection conditions. During
the recording, we record the register values and machine memory hash at the point
of injection. When we replay the trace and an exact point of injection is required for
a specific interrupt, we place a breakpoint on the PC of the point of injection, and
on each occurrence of the breakpoint exception, we check that the register values
and machine memory hash match before allowing the injection to happen.
While our implementation of record and replay is useful and logically correct,
there are a few limitations to this approach. First, we cannot support multiprocessor
record and replay. Second, we take some performance hit if a user process tries to
use hardware floating point unit (FPU). The reason behind this is that the OS
usually uses lazy hardware FPU save and restore, which, in our approach, can cause
incorrect sequences of events during replay because we rearranged the instructions
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Figure 4.2: FPU does not work with interrupt reordering
and generated extra FPU lazy save/restore faults (Figure 4.2). Hardware floating
point instructions that do not fault during recording can fault during replay due to
this rearrangement. Therefore, in order to avoid this issue, if a process starts to
use hardware floating point, instead of lazy save/restore, a full save/restore must
be performed thereafter for that particular process, resulting in slightly increased
context switch latency for those processes. This increased overhead, however, is less
of an issue in modern processors since most processes use FPU and OSes don’t always
lazy save/restore.
In summary, we have described how record and replay is traditionally done and
why such a hardware assisted approach is not available on ARM. We proposed a
software solution and claim that in many cases a precise point of injection is not
necessary, and when required, optimized hardware breakpoint handling can be used
to check for injection conditions.
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Figure 4.3: MVP system architecture
4.4 Implementation
We implement the above record and replay techniques on VMware′s MVP (Mobile
Virtualization Platform) (Barr et al. (2010)).
Figure 4.3 shows the architecture of MVP. MVP is a type 2 hypervisor designed
for ARMv7. The guest OS is a paravirtualized Linux that is directly executed under
user mode and is under the control of the VMM. The host can be any version of
Linux typically found in smartphones, e.g. Android. The host processes and OS run
just as they would normally, and a dedicated VM thread initiates the execution of
VMM and the guest by world switches, where the VMM/guest page tables, interrupt
vectors and coprocessors are loaded. The VMM encapsulates the guest and controls
the virtualization environment by maintaining a guest privileged mode and a guest
user mode, identical to the two modes a normal processor has for an operating sys-
tem running on bare metal. The paravirtualized guest calls into the VMM using
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hypercalls for sensitive privileged operations that cannot be performed normally un-
der user mode, such as switching between privileged mode and user mode, disabling
interrupts and performing I/O.
For the purpose of our implementation, in order to maintain logical correctness
during replay, we need to make modifications to the guest to ensure deterministic
guest kernel behavior. Other than fixing the interrupt injection point in the kernel,
which we will discuss later, we need to modify how calibration of the delay loop
is done. This procedure executes an infinite loop on the CPU until a few timer
interrupts occur. It then calculates, on average, how many loops the CPU can
execute for each period of timer tick (i.e. loops per jiffies, a.k.a. LPJ). This value
is then used by the kernel to simulate busy loop delays. This calibration procedure
generates unwanted, non-deterministic kernel behavior because it requires injection
of interrupts at non-fixed points. For the purpose of our implementation, we pass a
fixed LPJ from the VMM to maintain the same behavior between record and replay.
The guest kernel directly interacts with the VMM using hyercalls to request CPU
and memory services such as interrupts and paging. The guest uses hypercalls, for
example, to query the status of the interrupt completion, and to set up page tables for
user processes. The VMM communicates with the VMX on the host to submit timer,
storage and networking requests via asynchronous socket communication. Upon
completion of the these requests, the VMX signals the VMM about the completion
and the VMM delivers an interrupt to the guest just as a normal CPU would do,
i.e. banking the user mode registers and jumping to the PC of the interrupt handler.
In order to support our record and replay implementation, we modify the VMM so
that when the guest is in kernel mode, it only delivers interrupts at the preemption
point when the guest calls WFI (which is a special hypercall) and refrains from
delivering any interrupts for any other hypercalls, so that we maintain one fixed
point of injection for kernel events. In contrast, if an interrupt occurs in the guest
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user mode, the event is immediately delivered. When an interrupt is delivered to
the guest, we record the event and additional information that enables the replay to
identify its point of injection. In order for the replay to correctly identify the point
of injection for a non precise interrupt, we need:
1. Number of return to user mode hypercalls executed since guest start
2. Number of hypercalls executed since guest start
3. Number of faults delivered since guest start
4. Number of syscalls executed since guest start
In theory we could combine the four counters to form a logical guest event clock
indicating guest progress. However we kept separate counters in our implementation
for ease of debugging. It is important to note that the count for the number of
faults delivered should only count those faults destined for the guest (i.e. VMM
cannot handle it), and not include hidden faults such as shadow page table faults
that are resolved by the VMM, because those faults are non-deterministic and guest
transparent.
In order to ensure a correct replay, all hypercalls that return information on any
state of the guest VM must be recorded. They include timer hypercalls to get current
tick and time of the day, and hypercalls to query I/O completion status.
To illustrate what information is required for record and replay on MVP, we
describe how disk I/O is correctly recorded and replayed. Figure 5.7 shows the
architecture of the virtual disk device in MVP. An I/O request starts with a guest
kernel hypercall into the VMM requesting a block read. The result of this request
(i.e. return value of the hypercall) must be recorded. Then the request is passed
over the VMX side, which in turn interprets and submits the request to the host
operating system. Later, the host notifies the VMX about the completion of the
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request, which in turn notifies the guest by triggering an interrupt in the guest OS.
Since this event is non-deterministic (depending on the speed of read of the host), we
record the point of injection of this interrupt using the guest logical event clock. The
guest may, upon receiving the interrupt, query the result status of the I/O request
in the form of a hypercall, whose return value must be recorded. During replay, the
same sequence of events should occur, with the guest OS submitting the request first.
At that point, we simply reply with the same value as we recorded, and carry out
the request in the host OS. Assuming the same start state of the VM virtual disk
between record and replay, the I/O request is going to return with exactly the same
result however with a different delay from the host performing the I/O. The VMM
then monitors the guest event counters to reach the same number of events required
to inject the interrupt for I/O completion, and examines the status of the I/O. It
might have already occurred, in which case we simply inject it for real, or it might
not have, in which case we have to halt the guest and wait for the host to complete
the request. Then, we simply inject the interrupt, after which the guest should query
I/O completion status with the same hypercall, which we return with the value as
recorded. Note that we do not need to record the I/O blocks and simply rely on
the fact that the virtual disks will be at the same starting state between record and
replay, and therefore, with deterministic replay, should arrive at the same state and
transfer the same data between record and replay. Moreover, interrupt arrivals are
“throttled” during replay, and will not trigger a guest interrupt immediately until
the guest executes to the point of injection.
In order to support precise point of injection during replay, we need to detect when
precise point of injection is required for an interrupt. We maintain process affiliation
tuples, a set of tuples in the format of (Guest Page Table Base, PC, Interrupt). This
tuple is updated whenever an interrupt occurs using the current process′s page table,
PC and the involved interrupt. We remove a process from the set when a process
53
does a system call or faults, because in those cases the process becomes deterministic
and is “off the watch list”. When a “return to user” hypercall occurs which usually
signals the end of interrupt processing and returning to user mode, we check the
guest user mode PC against the set of tuples to discover possible signals. If the PC
we are returning to is different from the PC we recorded previously, a signal might
have occured and the interrupt involved requires a precise point of injection.
Another case that requires a precise point of injection during replay is shared
memory. We detect this case by enforcing a memory mapping policy that any physical
page may only have one user writable mapping at any time. The shadow page table
maintains a backmap that records all active mappings for a specific physical page.
This back mapping is updated each time a new mapping is created. Whenever a
new user mode mapping is created, we check that the new mapping is the only user
mode mapping for the physical page if the any previous user writable mapping exists,
and if that is not true, for all the previous mappings, we check against the process
affiliation tuples using the page table base to detect any registered interrupts. If
detected, it means that another process was trying to access the same page we are
about to access using a user writable privilege, and a precise point of injection is
required for that interrupt because shared memory occurred.
In order to ensure we inject at the correct place during replay for precise points
of injection, we need to record the register contents and memory hash at the point
of interrupt for comparison during replay. Each time an interrupt occurs during
recording, we need to compute the memory hash for the specific process the interrupt
occurred in. Obviously, it is inefficient to compute for every single page of the process
each time an interrupt occurs. Instead, we write protect the entire guest memory
and mark a page changed if the write protection is broken by the guest. Each time
when an interrupt occurs, we only compute the hash for the broken pages and re-
protect them, and we add the total hash with the hashes computed from the broken
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pages. An implication of this approach requires that the hash is additive. During
replay, we only compute the hash when a precise point of injection is required. For
our implementation, we use XOR as the hashing function.
4.5 Experiments and discussions
Compared to original MVP implementation with record and replay implemented,
our approach creates extra overhead in two areas. The first one is the overhead of
overlaying the event recording mechanisms and precise interrupt injection detection
on top of the current MVP implementation. The second one is the overhead of per-
forming memory hashing. We are concerned with how our implementation would
perform for kernel-intensive benchmarks, user-intensive benchmarks and real life ap-
plications. We would like to evaluate how much overhead is generated in each of
these two categories, for each type of workloads.
To evaluate our implementation, we run several micro-benchmarks and some
application benchmarks to validate the correctness of our approach and to show the
overhead of our design. We evaluate our work running MVP on a Pandaboard. It
has an OMAP4 ARMv7 processor with 1GB of memory. The guest virtual machine
disk images are stored on a RAM disk for all experiments. The reason for doing
so is because the default storage system, a SD card, is very slow and can take
roughly 80% of the total time of the benchmark run-time if the benchmark is I/O
intensive, overshadowing the true overhead of our implementation. By running all
experiments on RAM disk we ensure that the CPU is sufficiently utilized at all times
and the overhead we measure reflects a conservative view of the implementation’s
overhead. We also made sure that no other host processes were running, and dynamic
power/frequency scaling were off. For each experiment we run 5 trials and calculate
the average and standard deviation of the result. For each trial, we reset the VM
image to a clean image we created. Table 4.1 lists how each experiments work.
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Table 4.1: Evaluated experiments
Experiment name
¯
Experiment detail
¯
memcopy Copy 64MB of page aligned memory data 100
times.
fork Fork and execute a near-NOP program 1000 times.
getpid getpid() syscall 3500000 times.
getuid getuid() syscall 3500000 times.
memory read Create a circular linkned list spanning 64MB and
read through 10000k nodes.
process switch Create two processes and ping pong between them
1000000 times.
thread switch Create two threads and ping pong between them
100000 times.
process create and destroy Measures the time to create and destroy a new
child process 2000 times.
segv Triggers SIGSEGV 1500000 times.
nsort Sort an array of long intergers.
ssort Sort an array of strings.
bitfield Bit manipulation functions.
fpemu Software floating point.
fourier Calculate fourier transform coefficients.
assignment Task allocation algorithm.
huffman Compute Huffman encoding.
idea International Data Encryption Algorithm.
nnet Back-propogation network simulation.
ludecomp LU decomposition test.
busybox compile Compile busybox 1.21 from scratch.
kernel compile Compile Linux kernel 3.4 for ARM.
Python computation Compute N-body problem using Python.
Python threading Spawn and bounce among 20 Python threads.
Figure 4.4 shows the experiment results for the micro benchmarks. The result
shows that we typically have an overhead of 20% to 85% during recording and replay.
Replays are typically slightly faster than recording due to not having to wait in real
time for timers. Another possible cause for the speed increase is that exceptions
may coalesce during replay, resulting in better cache performance. The process
switching and thread switching benchmarks have higher overhead due to the way
the benchmarks are implemented. These two benchmarks are implemented using
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fork() which makes them share memory. Our implementation causes extra memory
faults due to processes not sharing the same user writable mapping. As the processes
switch from one to the other, they trigger extra repeated hidden faults (Figure 4.5).
In addition, we observe significant overhead on memory write benchmarks due to
having to compute the memory hash on more pages than for other micro-benchmarks
(Figure 4.6). These experiments show that the majority of the overhead comes from
two aspects of the implementation. The first one is the extra faults generated by
shared memory detections, because we hardly generate any overhead if we are only
dealing with processes without shared memory as shown in benchmark results other
than process/thread switch. The other source of major overhead comes from the
cost of hashing the memory as shown in the memcopy experiment, because we do not
generate the same huge overhead if we are just reading the memory as shown in the
memory read experiment.
In general, many of the micro benchmarks test virtualization bottlenecks, such
as system calls and MMU operations, and show the worst case performance for
each of the categories we test. On the contrary, Figure 4.7 shows the experimental
results for nbench, which is a purely computational benchmark. It is a well known
benchmark for testing only the computation power of the CPU. The details of each
category of the benchmark is also listed in Table 4.1. In these experiments, our
implementation hardly generates any extra overhead for CPU bound workloads as
expected. Note that we do not have a replay result for this suite of benchmark
because this benchmark consists of score based tests that run for a fixed amount of
time. The replay result would only show that we have a same benchmark result as
recorded because any gettimeoftheday result of the replay would be the same as
recorded.
Figure 4.8 shows the experimental results for two of the worst case scenario for
replay that could occur in our implementation: a specifically designed empty loop,
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that has no interaction with the kernel, and triggers signal/shared memory once in
a while:
//signal test
sigaction(SIGALARM, handler);
set_timer(ONE_SECOND);
while(true) {
i++;
}
handler()
{
print(i);
}
//shared memory test
fork();
if (process_id() == parent) {
while(true) {
i++;
}
} else {
while (true) {
sleep(1);
print(i);
}
}
These two experiments cap our worst case overhead for replay at about 20 times.
In these two cases, we have to take billions of breakpoint exceptions before reaching
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the correct point of injection. However, in reality, this almost never happens, because
most programs would do useful work and perhaps do system calls in loops. If a precise
point of injection lies within a loop, doing some useful work instead of an empty loop
greatly reduces the number of times we hit the same PC during replay. System calls,
on the other hand, provide vital determining points to the replay so that it does not
have to take multiple faults within a loop at all.
Figure 4.9 shows the experimental results for some applications. GCC induces
a high overhead when memory is hashing is used due to the workload consuming a
large amount of memory and triggering many hash computations. In contrast, our
Python benchmarks have a relatively small active working set and cause roughly 10%
overhead. In order to verify that we are indeed nowhere near the worst case scenario
we mentioned earlier for real life applications, we measure the average number of
breakpoint exception we took for each precise point of injection before a match
(Figure 4.10). This number has a high variance because the number entirely depends
on how many iterations in a loop has passed when the interrupt triggered. For real
life workloads, we have not observed any application that would cause the same
tremendous overhead as the signal test and shared memory test micro-benchmarks
we mentioned above.
In addition, in order to better understand the source of the overhead, we measure
the number of hashes computed for each of the workload we tested (Figure 4.6) and
the number of precise point of injection required per second for each workload (Figure
4.11). These two experiments demonstrate that our approach is much more sensitive
to active working set size than to number of precise point of injections.
Overall, we are able to maintain a relatively low, 10% to 20% overhead for pro-
grams with small active working sets. For programs consuming a large amount of
memory, our overhead swings between 1.5 times to a maximum of 3 times.
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Figure 4.4: Micro-benchmarks result (time to completion, lower is better)
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed how record and replay was traditionally done on the x86
architecture and why it is difficult to implement on ARM architecture. Instead of
ensuring literally correct replay as was done on x86, we proposed an alternative im-
plementation without any hardware assistance on paravirtualized guests to guarantee
logical correctness of the replay. We modify the VMM to be guest-process aware and
maintain important information that assists in detecting and handling corner cases
of our implementation to ensure replay correctness. We verified and tested our imple-
mentation on various micro and application benchmarks and explained our findings
on implementation details and record and replay overhead.
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65
5Storage virtualization using logging block store
(LBS) on Secure Digital cards
5.1 Introduction
Virtualization on mobile devices introduces several challenges in terms of storage
virtualization. The business model of mobile virtualization products encourages
that type 2 hypervisors are used so that the smartphone development pipeline is
minimally perturbed in trying to satisfy the multi-workspace scenario (Barr et al.
(2010)). Therefore, the guest images are stored as an image file on the host file
system. However, the device is susceptible to loss of power at any time, which
necessitates a robust image file format that can withstand such sudden interruption
during guest operation. In addition, typical mobile devices are usually equipped with
very limited internal NAND storage and external Secure Digital (SD) card. Because
SD cards are usually optimized for FAT file system and sequential reads and writes,
the characteristics of the card mismatches with the workload of the virtual machine,
which tend to have highly non-sequential I/O mixtures.
In this chapter, we first discuss the characteristics of the SD card, and using
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Mobile Virtualization Platform (MVP) as an example, illustrate why the workload
of the virtual machine mismatches with the characteristics of the SD card. We then
propose a solution using a new logging block store (LBS) image format and discuss
its performance gains and various implementation challenges.
5.2 Performance characteristics of SD cards
The design of an SD card optimizes for cost instead of speed. The NAND devices
inside an SD card are organized and managed by an Flash Translation Layer (FTL)
to give the impression of contiguous logical blocks. Meanwhile, the underlying mech-
anism usually groups large chunk of NAND devices into erase blocks, the smallest
unit which writes can occur. Unlike a solid state disk, due to space and cost con-
straint on the SD card, the FTL is usually simple and optimized solely for sequential
writes.
SD cards has a class rating that reflects sequential I/O bandwidth. This rating,
however, does not apply to random writes at all. Random writes are usually very
slow compared to sequential writes. Figure 5.1 shows the performance comparison
of sequential and random read/write on a 8GB Class 6 ADATA SD card evaluated
by sdperf, which opens a file or raw block devices and performs I/O benchmarks
according to the setup. We observed that there’s little difference in sequential and
random read speeds but huge distinction between sequential and random writes.
Figure 5.2 shows the ratio of sequential to random write bandwidth on five SD cards
(Table 5.1) from different manufacturers with different speed class ratings. Other
than the outlier of the 8GB SanDisk card which was labeled as Windows Phone
7 compliant (potentially optimized for certain random read/write), the five cards
behaves similarly beyond 16KB block size.
Because of the simplicity of the FTL on SD cards, writes usually cannot occur
on a small block size. If we issue a 4KB write to the SD card, the FTL has to read a
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Manufacturer Capacity Class Alloc. unit fat cluster
SanDiskTM 4GB 4 4MB 32KB
SanDiskTM(WP7) 8GB 4 4MB 32KB
KingstonTM 4GB 4 4MB 32KB
ADATATM 8GB 6 4MB 32KB
PNYTM 16GB 10 4MB 32KB
Table 5.1: SD card details.
Figure 5.1: 8GB ADATA Class 6 SD card I/O bandwidth as a function of block
size and I/O ordering
much larger block size called an allocation unit (4MB for the card in Figure 5.1), and
perform a read-modify-write operation. Some FTL supports efficient interleaving
of writes to multiple AUs as long as sequentiality is maintained within each AU
(Nath and Gibbons (2010)). Figure 5.3 shows the effect of interleaved writes to
multiple AUs. Some cards show good performance up to 4 AUs but the Kingston
card only supports one AU. For our work in this chapter, we disregard this potential
optimization and assume that non-sequential writes have a high penalty because we
are trying to find a uniform solution for all SD cards.
Another point to take note is that a few random writes can drag the performance
of the entire I/O workload down to the level of pure random writes. Figure 5.4
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Figure 5.2: Sequential:random write bandwidth ratio as a function of block size
shows an example, where we randomly insert random writes as a percentage of the
workload. Even 10% random writes slows down the entire workload to the level of
pure random writes.
Lastly, the I/O performance of the SD card can also be affected by the state of
the file system on the card. The FAT file system can fragment and degrade over
time, therefore causing reads and writes to a single file to be as slow as random reads
and writes. It matters then, when we try to store virtual machine disk images on
a FAT formatted file system because we must pay attention to avoid fragmentation
when allocating such images on the SD card.
5.3 Characteristics of the virtual machine I/O
From the perspective of the host, the virtual machine generates mostly non-sequential
I/O. There are three factors that contribute to the I/O characteristics:
The guest uses FAT and ext3 partitions. FAT is naturally fragmentation-prone
and ext3 journaling generates non-sequential writes. Figure 5.5 shows a write trace
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Figure 5.3: Write bandwidth as a function of the number of interleaved sequential
workloads, separated by 2AU, at 256KB block size
Figure 5.4: 8GB ADATA Class 6 SD card I/O bandwidth as a function of write
percentage in I/O mixture and I/O ordering
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Figure 5.5: 1 second sample of browsing session writes on ext3
to an ext3 partition during an Android 2.2 web browsing session. In addition to
the web browser accessing non-sequential browser data on the partition, the access
generates additional non-sequential writes to the meta-data, inodes and journal data
on the ext3 file system.
In order to provide robustness to the guest which we will discuss later, the guest
frequently checkpoints memory and CPU states so that it can recover from last
session or loss of power gracefully. An adapted Clock-Pro (Jiang et al. (2005))
working set estimation algorithm is used to selectively write cold pages to persistent
storage periodically so that it is faster to perform the checkpoint when one is actually
requested. This procedure generates non-sequential writes as shown in Figure 5.6.
Many applications in the guest generates non-sequential writes while writing to
configuration or temporary files. We examine several applications′ I/O traces:
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Figure 5.6: 180 second sample of background cold page writebacks of a large space
of guest physical memory
1. Android boot. The initial boot of an Android OS until the BOOT COMPLETED
intent.
2. Contacts Database. Import 2000 contacts into the Android Contacts applica-
tion and then search for and delete 40 contacts.
3. Mail Client. Use Android Mail 2.2.1 to access a mailbox of 24MB with 356
messages and 3 folders. The length of the messages and the attachments were
generated by SPECmail2009 benchmark.
4. Slideshow. Browse through 52 NASA images using Astro file browser.
5. Web Browsing. A one second sample of web browsing using Android 2.2
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Name Writable Filesystem Description
/system squashfs Android bina-
ries
/data x ext user-installed
programs and
data
/cache x ext cache space
used by
Android
/sdcard x fat SD card for
multimedia
files
/flex squashfs enterprise
customizations
Table 5.2: Disk partitions in the Android guest under test.
browser.
Table 5.2 shows the partition layout in our experiments. Note that squanshfs par-
titions are not writable. Table shows the result of our experiments. The size of the
trace is expressed in KB and as a count of total operations. A rough classification of
I/O sizes is provided in which each column is exclusive of adjacent columns. “Skip”
is a measure of sequentiality: the number of block accesses that are not adjacent to
a previous access. A skip percentage of 100 represents a completely non-sequential
workload; a skip percentage of 0 is completely sequential. Write and barrier percent-
ages are relative to the total number of I/O operations per partition. The results
demonstrated that small writes dominates the I/O profile for some workloads such
as Contacts Database and Email. In Section 5.2 we already established the fact
that random workloads only need 10% writes to be as slow as pure random writes.
Therefore, the I/O characteristics for many applications can be effectively counted
as random writes.
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Table 5.3: Charateristics of I/O traces (read/write breakdown).
5.4 Logging block store (LBS)
The disparity between the performance characteristics of the SD card and the char-
acteristics of the virtual machine I/O motivates that we come up with a solution to
bridge the gap. In addition to the problems aforementioned, we also need to ensure
that the virtual machine storage system is secure and reliable. Because of the size
limitation of the internal NAND storage on many mobile devices, the virtual machine
images must be stored on external SD cards, which is susceptible to security attacks
because the entire card has limited access control and is readable by all applications
with extended storage access permission on Android. Also, because of the volatility
of the battery power of the mobile devices, we need to be able to deal with sudden
loss of power without corrupting the VM images.
In this section, we present our solution: logging block store (LBS). Figure 5.7
illustrates how LBS interacts with the rest of the virtual machine systems. As MVP
is a paravirtualization platform, the frontend of the guest communicates directly
to the virtual machine’s vmx storage system via hypercalls. LBS is responsible for
interposing on top of the guest requests and translates them into host specific I/O
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operations and calls the host API to perform the actual I/O on the physical devices.
An LBS formatted image contains two separate files, a data file (suffixed .lbsd)
and a meta-data file (suffixed .lbsm). The data file contains the actual content of
the image, and is stored on an external storage (SD card) due to its significant size.
Meanwhile the meta-data file contains structural information and the meta-data of
the data file. Because the meta-data file is relatively small in size, we store this file
on the internal storage which is usually formatted with JFFS2 or ext3/4 file systems
and has access controls, so that the more secure and robust file system on the internal
storage can protect the meta-data file and simplify our design. Figure 5.8 and Figure
5.9 illustrates the format of LBS files.
5.4.1 LBS format
The LBS data file is divided into fixed 1KB size blocks and fixed 256KB size clusters.
In order to solve the issue of non-sequential writes from the guest we mentioned
before, when the guest writes a block to its storage, from the virtual machine’s
perspective, it only writes to a logical block represented by a logical block number
(LBN). The virtual machine then translates this requests into writes of some physical
block indexed by physical block number (PBN) within the LBS data file. To ensure
that we only write sequentially to the physical devices at maximum possible speed,
all writes always append to the end of current active cluster and are buffered until the
entire cluster is filled up or the guest issues a barrier. LBS maintains a list of empty
clusters and activates another empty cluster when the current one is fully written.
A cluster can become close to empty when a physical block within the cluster are
disassociated with its logical block because the logical block is written again by the
guest. A garbage collection (GC) thread in the VMM maintains a list of near empty
clusters and reclaim them when the data file is running out of empty clusters.
The LBS meta-data file is an append-only log of meta-data and barrier entries.
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Each writes from the guest appends a LBN → PBN mapping entry to the meta-
data and each barrier from the guest appends a barrier entry to the meta-data.
Each meta-data entry flags and optimizes for zero blocks and also has checksums
and timestamps for non-zero blocks. When a meta-data file is opened or reaches
maximum size, we perform a sweep of garbage collections to remove stale entries.
To minimize latency, the data file is opened using O DIRECT flag to bypass any
host buffering and the entire data file is fully allocated on the FAT partition once
created, avoiding any further fragmentation issues. The meta-data file requires about
12MB per 1GB of logical block space. It is stored on the internal storage and opened
with mmap to achieve both speed and space advantages by letting the host manage
the caching and writebacks of the meta-data file according to its memory pressure.
5.4.2 Reliability and security
The reliability of the LBS file system is based on the robustness of internal storage
where the meta-data file is stored. The internal storage is usually formatted with
YAFFS or JFFS2, which guarantees the robustness of the meta-data file. LBS cannot
provide those reliability guarantees when the meta-data file is not stored on a log
structured file system. In addition to the inherent file system protection on the
meta-data file, when guest issues a barrier write, we checksum all meta-data entries
since last barrier and preserve that information with the barrier entry we write to
the meta-data file. If a missing or corrupted barrier is detected, we rollback to the
last barrier which maintains the expected guest barrier semantics.
When the meta-data file is sufficiently robust, the block checksums in the meta-
data file, which are computed by 32 bit Fletcher checksum (Fletcher (1982)) or
SHA-256 checksum, guarantees that the data file is robust, as long as the data file
is synced to the physical media before the meta-data file is. The checksums are also
able to detect media failures as well as tampering or corruption by attackers or other
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applications.
There exists two major security threats for the storage system: attacks by soft-
ware from within the phone, and attacks from loss of physical device. We encrypt
the LBS data file at block granularity with XTS-AES cipher and store the key in the
internal storage. We have the same security guarantee as the Android application
keystore in the event of loss of physical devices. We also protect the data file from
being maliciously modified by other software on the device. However, encryption
alone does not protect the data file against replay attacks which attempts to inject
a known encrypted block from the past into the LBS data file. This is prevented
by introducing a logically clocked timestamp for each block that increments after
each write and have this timestamp involved in the block checksum process. In this
way, if a replay attack occurs, the wrong timestamp would cause the checksum to
mismatch.
5.4.3 Garbage collection
LBS system spawns a separate thread for each image that garbage collects clusters
in the background. A cluster is collected when and only when the number of free
clusters is low. The garbage collection algorithm selects clusters based on a number
of parameters. A collected cluster will have its occupied blocks loaded into the write
queue in the background and later written to the current active cluster. The LBS
data file is over-provisioned (e.g. 112%) to ensure that there are adequate free space
to optimally run the GC.
The GC selection should take many factors into account. A simple and naive
algorithm only takes the “emptiness” of a cluster into account. In reality, this al-
gorithm is often insufficient and slow. Because the geometry of the SD card can be
quite different and affected by many factors as discussed in Section 5.2, the LBS data
file, when allocated by the FAT file system during creation, can sometimes have frag-
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mentation or not start at an AU boundary. This means that a seemingly contiguous
write to the LBS data file’s clusters can actually span multiple AUs and therefore
degrades to non-sequential writes to the physical device when non-contiguous cluster
writes occur. For example, a write to cluster 5 then a write to cluster 4 would, in
an ideal case, translates to a write to AU 5 then write to AU 4, which would mean
a sequential write to both AU. However, misaligned geometry sometimes cause the
clusters to not start on AU boundary and the above example would translates to
partial writes to AU 5 and 6 then partial writes to AU 4 and 5, which is terrible in
terms of performance. In order to solve this issue, we introduce extra weighted pa-
rameters in the LBS GC selection algorithm to try to guarantee as many contiguous
free clusters as possible:
1. Emptiness: The number of unoccupied blocks within a cluster.
2. Left empty: An award for clusters whose left sibling is empty. Promotes con-
tiguous clusters.
3. Outlier correction: An award for clusters who have very few unoccupied clus-
ters but have siblings that are very empty. We try to treat an outlier within
a contiguous near empty clusters the same as if it is almost empty because
collecting such full clusters can extend the length of a contiguous series of
clusters.
4. Write position: An award for clusters who is next to the current active cluster.
This promotes contiguous writes.
Those four components are equally weighted for experiments in this chapter but
depends on the amount of over-provision in the data file. The more over-provisioning
we set, the more important “write position” and “left empty” become. The less
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device ID the partition accessed by this I/O
R/W flag indicating whether this I/O is
a read or a write
fragment position in scatter-gather list
offset location on disk
length number of bytes accessed
barrier flag indicating that this record rep-
resents a barrier request
Table 5.4: Trace record
over-provisioning we set (below 25%), the higher the GC pressure is, and the more
important “emptiness” is.
5.5 Experiments and discussions
In order to evaluate the performance of LBS, we perform several synthetic and trace-
based tests to show the benefit of LBS and the cost of write amplification, integrity
checking and encryption.
All experiments are done on an HTC Nexus One with 1GHz Qualcomm Snap-
dragon chipset and 512MB of DRAM. The phone ran CyanogenMod 7.1, an after-
market version of Android 2.3.
We use sdperf discussed in Section 5.2 to perform the synthetic tests and use
blksim to perform the trace-base tests. blksim replays a trace gathered during
execution of a guest application. The format of the trace is shown in Table 5.4.
blksim replays the trace by first reading the trace into the memory and then opening
a raw block device using O DIRECT flag and issuing I/O commands as recorded.
We use the same workload as desribed in Section 4 with the Android Boot and
Slideshow workloads repeated five times to create longer runs and reduce variance.
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5.5.1 Benefit of LBS
We compare the performance of a LBS formatted guest image against a “flat” guest
image which does not buffer I/O and uses a simple one to one mapping of LBN to
PBN. Figure 5.10 shows the ratio of bandwidth achieved for LBS image to flat image,
running synthetic tests. Garbage collection was not triggered in these experiments.
The graph shows similarity between sequential and random reads as expected.
The slowdown of LBS is due to the extra layer of abstraction, encryption, and in-
tegrity checking. This result suggests that it is better to choose a flat image format
for read-only partitions.
The graph also demonstrates significant performance gains on random writes,
especially with small random writes, because LBS consolidates those writes and turn
them into fewer and sequential ones.
Figure 5.11 demonstrates the performance of LBS against flat on trace-based
tests. Each test was repeated three times and averaged. We set aside 160MB for
each test to make sure that there are sufficient free blocks to prevent garbage col-
lection from triggering. This experiment shows that we achieve huge performance
gains when the workload has many small writes, as demonstrated by the Contact
Database (about 17x). The email workload gains about 5x speed but does not have
as impressive gains as others due to its high percentage of barrier operations, which
forces a flush of the buffer and causes small writes for LBS.
5.5.2 Garbage collection
Garbage collection thread runs in the background and collects near empty clusters
when the LBS data file is under pressure. The background process causes additional
writes for collected clusters. These additional writes are inexpensive because they
are done in the background during inactivity, and are sequential writes.
Table 5.5 shows the effect of write amplification due to LBS for the two workloads
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trace requested LBS writes LBS writes with GC
writes without GC
Contacts 219124 219124 blocks 223593 blocks,
blocks 855 clusters 873 clusters
(802 contiguous)
Email 216057 215972 blocks 220160 blocks
blocks 843 clusters 860 clusters
(813 contiguous)
Table 5.5: Software-level write amplification due to garbage collection. 12% addi-
tional storage used for garbage collection.
that triggered garbage collection. The block size in this experiment is 1KB and the
cluster size is 256KB. The first column is the number of writes requested by the guest
operating system. The second column is the number of writes for LBS without GC.
This is gathered with 100% over-provisioning so that the GC never triggers. The
third column is the number of writes for LBS with GC. This is gathered with 12%
over-provisioning and the GC does trigger. This table shows that when GC is not
involved, LBS is able to consolidate the writes submitted by the operating system
into fewer actual writes because applications sometimes overwrite stale data. When
GC is involved, we have reasonable low write amplification and because those writes
are mostly contiguous, the cost is relatively low.
As discussed in Section 5, a smart GC algorithm improves the efficiency of LBS
especially when we have ample over-provisioning for GC. Using sdperf, we run
experiments that issue random writes from the guest and ensures that ample GC
activities are involved for the experiments. Figure 5.12 shows the effect of smart
weighted GC when compared to naive GC. This graph demonstrates that when GC
is involved, naive GC has much worse performance when GC over-provisioning is
high, because the weighted GC generates more sequential writes; meanwhile when
GC over-provisioning is low, the weighted GC has worse performance because it
generates more GC writes than naive GC.
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5.5.3 Encryption and integrity checking
Figure 5.11 also shows how encryption and integrity checking affect the performance
of LBS. The level of security of LBS can be chosen between a fast but less secure
Fletcher checksum or a slower but much more secure SHA-256 checksum. Because
the level of indirection and the cost of issuing I/O commands are fixed regardless
of block size, the larger the block size is, the more visible impact encryption has on
the overall LBS performance. In our synthetic tests, we see an approximately 4-8%
slowdown for using SHA-256 checksum on block size less than 4KB. This number
is about 13-17% for block size of 256KB. For trace-based tests, we observe variable
slowdowns for using encryption depending on how many barriers are present in the
test. Email Client saw a 2% slowdown for having high barrier percentage meanwhile
Android Boot experienced 35% slowdown.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated why the characteristics of the SD card often mis-
matches with the workload of a virtual machine on mobile phones, and that it is
unwise to store a flat virtual machine disk image directly on the SD card. We pro-
pose a solution using Logging Block Store to bridge such gap and ensure that many
non-sequential writes from the guest are transformed into sequential writes on the
SD card, thereby improving guest I/O performance. We also describe how reliability
and security requirements of virtualied mobile devices can be met with LBS.
5.7 Acknowledgement for this chapter
This is a joint work with VMware while the author did an internship there. The
author helped with creating benchmarks, analyzing the performance of LBS and
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.lbsd Block 0
Block 
1
Block 
...
Block 
255
Block 
256
Block 
257
Block 
...
Block 
511
Block 
512
Block 
...
Block 
...
Cluster 0
Cluster 1 (active)
Cluster ...
Empty block
Occupied block
Figure 5.8: LBS data file format
.lbsm
LBS header 
Meta-data entry
Barrier entry
Write position
Logical block index
Physical block index
Zero block?
Run length (n)
Block checksum 0
Timestamp 0
Block checksum ...
Timestamp ...
Block checksum (n-1)
Timestamp (n-1)
Barrier magic
Meta-data checksum
Figure 5.9: LBS meta file format
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Figure 5.10: 8GB ADATA Class 6 SD card I/O bandwidth: Ratio between LBS
and Flat file format
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Figure 5.11: Performance of application I/O traces without garbage collection
Figure 5.12: Performance comparison of naive GC against weighted GC using
sdperf, with garbage collection, at different GC over-provisioning levels
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6Conclusions
6.1 Contributions
Virtualization on mobile and embedded systems is a new and interesting area of re-
search. The different hardware and software ecosystem on these systems challenges
us to discover techniques to circumvent many difficulties created by the inefficiencies
of the I/O systems, or the relatively lack of hardware features to support virtualiza-
tion functionalities such as CPU virtualization and record and replay. This thesis
presents several contributions to existing virtual machine research.
We discussed several important findings regarding virtualization implementa-
tions:
1. It is possible to transparently virtualize without any guest modification on
any architecture with hardware breakpoints. We use control flow analysis to
detect sensitive instructions within the virtual machine, and trap them using
hardware breakpoints. We built a prototype proof of concept on both x86 and
ARM architecture to demonstrate its portability and feasibility.
2. Using guest introspection, which is the ability to inspect on virtual machines to
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gain guest specific information such as processes, signals and memory sharing
without having to modify the guest, we are able to efficiently implement record
and replay without using hardware branch counters.
3. SD cards and similar low-cost flash media favors sequential writes and has
terrible performance on non-sequential writes. This characteristic must be
taken into account when designing virtualized storage subsystems, such as a
virtual machine disk image, on those devices.
6.2 Future work
In the long run, ARMv8 and its Virtualization Extension (VE) will be ubiquitous,
however our work may prove to be useful on some other classes of devices. Internet
of Things (IoT) devices, for example, may feature smaller and simpler processors
and may be an interesting area to consider core virtualization in.
It is possible to take our record and replay implementation and implement useful
virtualization features built upon it. For example, we could construct a fault tolerant
mobile operating system, or a debugger for mobile OS. We could also use the record
and replay functionality to impose taint tracking and security properties on mobile
operating systems by running a shadowed copy of the running OS and selectively
replaying the trace with different inputs.
For our LBS work, it is worth exploring how to secure the LBS encryption key
from host compromises using hardware security measures such as Trustzone. Also,
although we only discussed storage virtualization as an example, virtualizing other
peripheral devices on mobile phones is not trivial. Network device virtualization for
example, may involve telephony and carrier issues. GPS device virtualization, on
the other hand, might contain security and privacy problems.
It would also be interesting to try to apply the techniques we proposed to a
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variety of other emerging platforms and embedded systems. MIPS for example, is
a valid target for our implementation due to having hardware breakpoints and no
hardware branch counters.
In addition to the technical challenges we explored and discussed in this thesis,
our work may prove useful to hardware designers of future CPUs on how to efficiently
support possible virtualization use cases with minimal efforts. For example, CPU
virtualization can be trivialized by eliminating sensitive instructions and have all
of those instructions fault instead. Also, cheap context and mode switches would
significantly improve VMM performance and reduce the amount of optimization
required to achieve optimal performance.
Another notable trend of everyday computing is the prevalence of flash storage
devices. Traditional filesystems and storage structures are often inadequate at han-
dling flash storage devices’ hardware characteristics. Log structured filesystems or
journaling filesystems are often required to provide efficient storage capabilities to
system or application software. System level changes, such as having FTL aware
filesystems or operating systems, may potentially become a hot research area.
In conclusion, we are able to provide efficient virtualization functionalities despite
hardware hurdles and making virtualization one step closer to a solution for isolation,
encapsulation and security needs for everyday computing.
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